A Path to  Inure  Peace: Consolidating the Perplexities of the Private Inurement and Private Benefit Doctrines by Westenberger, Mark C.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 92 Issue 1 
2014 
A Path to "Inure" Peace: Consolidating the Perplexities of the 
Private Inurement and Private Benefit Doctrines 
Mark C. Westenberger 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Taxation-Federal Commons, and the Tax Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mark C. Westenberger, A Path to "Inure" Peace: Consolidating the Perplexities of the Private Inurement 
and Private Benefit Doctrines, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 227 (2014). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss1/10 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
227 
A PATH TO “INURE” PEACE: CONSOLIDATING 
THE PERPLEXITIES OF THE PRIVATE 
INUREMENT AND PRIVATE BENEFIT 
DOCTRINES 
INTRODUCTION 
The preferential tax treatment of charities is an ancient tradition.
1
 This 
treatment was originally grounded in divine, but also procedural, 
principles.
2
 During antiquity, revenue agents felt that the gods who owned 
religious institutions were beyond the agents’ jurisdiction.3 
Over time, the justification for the preferential tax treatment of 
charities
4
 has generally shifted to corporeal grounds.
5
 This shift began in 
earnest with the Elizabethan Statute of Charitable Uses in 1601.
6
 The 
Statute’s preamble is widely considered to have established the 
foundations of modern charity law by providing the first authoritative 
definition of charitable purposes.
7
 The Statute’s enumerated purposes, 
which included relief of the poor, the promotion of education, and aid for 
various public works,
8
 were not considered to be exclusive, but were 
instead intended to form a broad constellation of philanthropy.
9
 The 
 
 
 1. “And Joseph made it a law over the land of Egypt unto this day, that Pharaoh should have the 
fifth part; except the land of the priests only, which became not Pharoah’s.” Genesis 47:26 (King 
James) (internal citations omitted). 
 2. JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 294 (4th ed. 2010). 
 3. Id. See also Miranda Perry Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax Subsidies: The Role of 
Distributive Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 505, 511 (2010). 
 4. A matter of nomenclature: this Note will deal exclusively with organizations exempt from 
federal income taxation under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Throughout the Note, I 
will refer to these organizations as “charities” and “charitable organizations.” The Supreme Court has 
held that the common law of charitable trusts must be read into section 501(c)(3) of the Code, and 
therefore all organizations exempt under section 501(c)(3) must be “charitable.” Thus, although 
section 501(c)(3) enumerates several purposes for which a tax-exempt organization may be formed 
(including religious, charitable, or educational), all organizations exempt under section 501(c)(3) may 
be broadly called “charities.” See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 585–92 (1983). 
 5. See infra note 15 for a discussion of several theoretical justifications for the charitable 
exemption. 
 6. 1601, 43 Eliz., c. 4 (Eng.). 
 7. John P. Persons, John J. Osborn, Jr. & Charles F. Feldman, Criteria for Exemption Under 
Section 501(c)(3), in IV RESEARCH PAPERS: TAXES 1909, 1912–13 (1977). 
 8. Professor Jill Horwitz has examined the remarkable similarities between the enumerated 
charitable purposes in the Preamble to the Elizabeth Statute of Charitable Uses and the purposes 
merited as providing a path to salvation in William Landland’s fourteenth century poem, The Vision of 
Piers the Plowman. Jill Horwitz, Nonprofits and Narrative: Piers Plowman, Anthony Trollope, and 
Charities Law, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 989, 995–1000. See also WILLIAM LANGLAND, THE VISION OF 
PIERS THE PLOWMAN 113–23 (W.W. Skeat trans., 1922).  
 9. Persons, Osborn & Feldman, supra note 7, at 1913. See also Chauncey Belknap, The Federal 
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underlying theme of the enumerated purposes, and the Statute itself, was 
that charities should serve a public benefit.
10
  
When Congress enacted the Tariff Act of 1894 that first exempted 
charities from federal taxation,
11
 the influence of the English law of 
charitable trusts remained.
12
 So, too, did a fundamental tenet: “[C]harities 
were to be given preferential treatment because they provide a benefit to 
society.”13 Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that “underlying all 
relevant parts of the [Internal Revenue] Code” are “common-law standards 
of charity” that require charities to “serve a public purpose.”14  
Hence, the traditional rationale
15
 for the charitable tax exemption is 
 
 
Income Tax Exemption of Charitable Organizations: Its History and Underlying Policy, in IV 
RESEARCH PAPERS: TAXES 2025, 2027 (1977) (stating that “the courts interpreted the favored uses 
broadly as including religion, education, and miscellaneous public uses”). 
 10. Persons, Osborn & Feldman, supra note 7, at 1913. See also Thomas Kelley, Rediscovering 
Vulgar Charity: A Historical Analysis of America’s Tangled Nonprofit Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2437, 2448–51 (2005). 
 11. The Tariff Act of 1894 provided tax exemption for “corporations, companies, or associations 
organized and conducted solely for charitable, religious, or educational purposes.” Tariff Act of 1894, 
ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556 (1894). 
 12. “The draftsmen of the 1894 income tax law, which included the first charitable exemption 
provision, relied heavily on English concepts of taxation; and the list of exempt organizations appears 
to have been patterned upon English income tax statutes.” Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 
574, 589 n.13 (1983). 
 13. Id. at 589. 
 14. Id. at 586.  
 15. In addition to the traditional rationale, there are several and sundry academic theories 
explaining the existence of the charitable exemption. First, there is the income measurement theory, 
which argues that because the charitable sector doesn’t generally produce profits in the same way as 
the for-profit sector, it is difficult to measure a charity’s net income. Boris I. Bittker & George K. 
Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 
307–16 (1976). Second, there is the capital subsidy theory, which argues that charities should qualify 
for exemption when they are the more efficient producers of goods and services (i.e., when there is 
contract failure), and they are undercapitalized. Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting 
Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 86 (1981). See also 
Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980); Henry B. Hansmann, 
Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497 (1981). Third, there is the donative 
theory, which argues that charitable organizations should receive exemption based on their ability to 
generate substantial donative support from the public. Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The 
Charitable Status of Nonprofit Hospitals: Toward a Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 WASH L. 
REV. 307, 389–405 (1991). Fourth, there is the altruism theory, which argues that the decision of a 
charity’s founders to forgo profits is an appropriate justification in itself for extending exemption to 
the charity. Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501, 628–30 (1990). 
Fifth, there is the risk compensation theory, which argues that exemption is a way to compensate 
charities for the inherent financial risks that accompany the provision of public goods and services. 
Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charitable Organizations: A 
Theory of Risk Compensation, 50 FLA. L. REV. 419, 439–61 (1998). Finally, there is the access theory, 
which argues that in order to qualify for exemption, a charity should either provide goods and services 
to previously underserved communities, or provide goods and services to the general public that would 
otherwise be unavailable. John D. Colombo, The Role of Access in Charitable Tax Exemption, 82 
WASH. U. L.Q. 343, 363–74 (2004).  
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anchored in this mutually supportive relationship
16
 between the 
government and charitable organizations.
17
 As such, the Supreme Court 
has labeled tax exemptions a form of subsidy
18
 justified by the public 
benefit provided by charities—although the Court was cautious to state 
that exemptions are not “in all respects identical” to cash subsidies.19 But, 
still, the Court has held that these subsidies are conditioned on the fact that 
the charity’s activities are not “conducted for private gain.”20 
This prohibition against private gain, that is, a prohibition against 
distributing net earnings to the individuals in control of an organization, is 
the defining feature of a charitable organization.
21
 Professor Henry 
Hansmann labeled this prohibition the “nondistribution constraint.”22 
Hansmann argued that the prohibition does not preclude a charity from 
making profits—in fact, many do make substantial profits—but it does 
require the charity to use those profits to further its charitable mission.
23
 
The nondistribution constraint and the sine qua non that a charity must 
serve a public, rather than a private, purpose form the nucleus of the 
private inurement
24
 and private benefit doctrines,
25
 which will be the focus 
of this Note. 
The private inurement and private benefit doctrines, along with the 
related intermediate sanctions regime
26
 under section 4958 of the Internal 
Revenue Code, are the key enforcement tools that the Internal Revenue 
Service and the courts may use to regulate financial abuses by charities 
and ensure that charities are being operated for the public’s benefit—not 
the benefit of private individuals.
27
 Broadly speaking, the private 
inurement and private benefit doctrines allow the Service to revoke a 
charity’s tax-exempt status if the charity is no longer being operated 
 
 
 16. See IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Comm’r, 325 F.3d 1188, 1195 (10th Cir. 2003) (“The public-
benefit requirement highlights the quid pro quo nature of tax exemptions: the public is willing to 
relieve an organization from the burden of taxation in exchange for the public benefit it provides.”). 
 17. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 590–91. See also Belknap, supra note 9, at 2029; Developments 
in the Law—Nonprofit Corporations, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1578, 1620 (1992); Fleischer, supra note 3, 
at 518; Atkinson, supra note 15, at 605–10; Hall & Colombo, supra note 15, at 345.  
 18. Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983). 
 19. Id. at n.5.  
 20. Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578, 581 (1924).  
 21. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, supra note 15, at 501; Anup Malani & 
Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 2017, 2018 (2007); Dana Brakman 
Reiser, Charity Law’s Essentials, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2011).  
 22. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 15, at 838.  
 23. Id.  
 24. See infra Part II.A. 
 25. See infra Part II.B. 
 26. See infra Part II.C. 
 27. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 2, at 445–71. 
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exclusively for charitable purposes.
28
 The intermediate sanctions regime 
allows the Service to impose excise tax sanctions, usually in lieu of 
revocation of the charity’s tax-exempt status, when a charity provides 
excessive economic benefits to certain “insiders.”29 
The private inurement and private benefit doctrines generally differ in 
two respects.
30
 First, although an incidental amount of private benefit 
usually will not jeopardize a charity’s tax-exempt status, the ban on 
private inurement is statutorily absolute.
31
 Second, although the private 
benefit doctrine may be applied against any person receiving an 
inappropriate benefit not afforded to the general public, the ban on private 
inurement applies only to persons commonly referred to as “insiders.” 
“Insiders” are generally considered to be those exercising a substantial 
level of control over the charity, such as directors, officers, or key 
employees.
32
  
The charitable sector is an important part of the U.S. economy.
33
 A 
2009 Congressional report estimated that charities employ more than 
seven percent of the U.S. workforce.
34
 That same report found that in 
2009, charities had $1.4 trillion in revenues and held $2.6 trillion in 
assets.
35
 Therefore, because charities employ such a large segment of the 
U.S. workforce, generate such substantial revenues, and hold such sizeable 
assets, it is critical that the Service and the courts have a functional and 
effective enforcement mechanism to protect the public’s interests. 
This Note will proceed in five parts. Part I will briefly outline the 
exemption of charities under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue 
Code. Part II will examine the law and ideology of the private inurement 
and private benefit doctrines, as well as that of the related intermediate 
sanctions regime. Part III will utilize two cases, United Cancer Council v. 
 
 
 28. Id. For more on the private inurement doctrine, see infra Part II.A. For more on the private 
benefit doctrine, see infra Part II.B. 
 29. Id. “Insiders” are called “disqualified persons” under the intermediate sanctions regime, and 
generally refer to persons exercising a certain degree of control or influence over the organization. For 
more on the intermediate sanctions regime and disqualified persons, see infra Part II.C.  
 30. BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS, 537 (10th ed. 2011). 
 31. I write that the ban on private inurement is “statutorily” absolute because the Code states that 
no amount of private inurement is tolerated. However, it is unclear whether, in practice, the Service 
and the courts tolerate an incidental amount of private inurement. See id. at 531–33. 
 32. Id. at 537. See also Oliver A. Houck, With Charity for All, 93 YALE L.J. 1415, 1427 (1984) 
(“The trigger for [the private inurement provision] is an ‘insider,’ one who by virtue of his position can 
control or influence an organization’s action.”). 
 33. See generally FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 2, at 12–19. 
 34. MOLLY F. SHERLOCK & JANE G. GRAVELLE, AN OVERVIEW OF THE NONPROFIT AND 
CHARITABLE SECTOR 4 (Congressional Research Service, Nov. 17, 2009). 
 35. Id. at 9–11. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss1/10
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Commissioner
36
 and Capital Gymnastics Booster Club, Inc. v. 
Commissioner,
37
 as case studies to evaluate the application of and 
distinctions between the two doctrines. In Part IV, I will argue that that 
these two doctrines should be consolidated into one doctrine for three 
reasons. First, the private inurement doctrine is murky and subject to 
inconsistent application. Second, the private inurement doctrine is 
redundant, because it has largely been supplanted by the intermediate 
sanctions regime and may be subsumed within the private benefit doctrine. 
Third, the consolidation of the two doctrines will result in judicial 
economy. Part V will conclude. 
I. THE CHARITABLE EXEMPTION: I.R.C. § 501(C)(3)  
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code imposes three 
requirements on a charity seeking exemption. First, the charity must be 
organized and operated exclusively for tax-exempt purposes.
38
 Second, no 
part of the net earnings of the charity may inure to the benefit of any 
shareholder or individual.
39
 Third, the charity must refrain completely 
from engaging in any political campaigns or activities and may not engage 
in more than an insubstantial amount of lobbying.
40
  
Expounding on the Code’s requirements, the Treasury Regulations set 
out organizational and operational tests that charities must meet for 
exemption.
41
 A charity meets the organizational test primarily by filing 
articles of incorporation that satisfy two requirements. First, the articles 
must limit the purposes of the charity to one or more exempt purposes.
42
 
Second, the articles must not “expressly empower” the charity to engage 
in more than an insubstantial amount of non-exempt activities.
43
 
The operational test, which requires that a charity engage “primarily in 
 
 
 36. 165 F.3d 1173 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 37. T.C.M. (RIA) 2013–193. 
 38. Among the enumerated purposes of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) are: “religious, charitable, scientific, 
testing for public safety, literary, or educational.” I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2010).  
 39. This provision is the prohibition against private inurement. The prohibition generally 
prohibits any insider of the charity—such as a director, officer, or significant donor—from siphoning 
off any part of the charity’s assets or earnings. Id. 
 40. The Service has not provided a specific number to define “substantial,” but charitable 
organizations seeking more definitive guidelines on lobbying may file what is commonly referred to as 
a 501(h) election. This is a one-page form that the organization may elect to file with the IRS 
regarding its lobbying activities, and in return the organization effectively receives a safe harbor 
provision under which a generous amount of lobbying is allowed. I.R.C. § 501(h) (2010).  
 41. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)–(c) (2012).  
 42. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(i)(a) (2012). The exempt purposes set forth in Treasury 
Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1) essentially mirror those of section 501(c)(3) of the Code and include 
religious, charitable, scientific, etc. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1) (2012). 
 43. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(i)(B) (2012).  
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activities which accomplish one or more . . . exempt purposes,” generally 
mirrors the requirements of section 501(c)(3) of the Code, but additionally 
offers a few interesting modifications.
44
 First, in determining whether a 
charity is operated “exclusively” for exempt purposes, the Treasury 
Regulations interpret “exclusively” as “primarily.”45 Second, the Treasury 
Regulations denote charities that violate the ban on political activities or 
the limitations on lobbying as “action organizations.”46 A charity is at risk 
of becoming an action organization if it engages in too much lobbying, 
any amount of direct political campaigning, or adopts a direct political 
purpose.
47
 
Furthermore, the Treasury Regulations define the term “charitable.”48 
Indeed, the regulations state that the term should be construed in its 
“generally accepted legal sense” and is therefore broad and not limited by 
the specific enumerated purposes in section 501(c)(3) and the 
regulations.
49
 The Joint Committee on Taxation has articulated the legal 
definition of “charity” as being “best understood as including activities 
that are intended to benefit the general welfare or public interest” and has 
stated that this definition “can be construed broadly or narrowly . . . to 
reflect changing notions of the public interest.”50 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that the common law standards 
of charity underlie section 501(c)(3) of the Code.
51
 Accordingly, any 
charity seeking exemption must provide a public benefit and not violate 
established public policy.
52
 Likewise, the charitable purposes first 
enumerated in the Elizabethan Statute of Charitable Uses in 1601 and 
 
 
 44. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (2012). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3) (2012). 
 47. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(i)–(iv) (2012). 
 48. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (2012). 
 49. Id. See also Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 15, at 330–33; Houck, supra note 32, at 1422–23 
(comparing the enumerated purposes in the Statute of Charitable Uses and the Treasury Regulations 
and noting that “[f]rom 1601 to 1982, few changes can be observed in the concept or the language of 
charity”). Professor Thomas Kelley has argued that when the Treasury promulgated the 1959 
regulations, which adopted the “generally accepted legal sense” meaning of charity, it departed from 
what Congress had intended. Kelley, citing the work of Bruce Hopkins, has argued that prior to 1959, 
the statutory construction of the Code, the legislative history, and the Treasury Regulations 
“consistently defined charity as ‘relief of the poor.’” Kelley has credited Congress’s silence in the 
wake of this change as resulting in a broad, and arguably vague, modern definition of charity. Kelley, 
supra note 10, at 2470–72.  
 50. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PRESENT LAW OF THE 
FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES AND OTHER TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 62 (Apr. 19, 
2005).  
 51. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983). 
 52. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss1/10
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developed in the common law over centuries may be read into the Code.
53
 
These purposes include relief of the poor, the advancement of education, 
and the advancement of religion, but may also include purposes not 
specifically enumerated in a statute that nonetheless benefit an indefinite 
number of persons in the community.
54
 Thus, the definition of “charity” is 
not static—rather, it is elastic, malleable, and adapting with the times. 
II. PRIVATE INUREMENT, PRIVATE BENEFIT & THE INTERMEDIATE 
SANCTIONS REGIME 
In this Part, I will discuss the private inurement and private benefit 
doctrines, as well as the related intermediate sanctions regime. These 
enforcement tools serve to enforce the nondistribution constraint, prevent 
a charity from dispensing improper economic benefits, and guarantee that 
the common law requirement that a charity serve a public purpose is met. I 
will first discuss the private inurement doctrine, then explain the private 
benefit doctrine, and conclude with the intermediate sanctions regime.  
A. Private Inurement   
Since 1909
55
 each version of the Internal Revenue Code exempting 
charities from taxation has included a ban on private inurement.
56
 
Regarding the prohibition’s legislative beginnings, Professor Darryll Jones 
has written that the measure was meant to prevent any “‘element of 
personal gain.’”57 Further, exemption would be granted only to charities 
“‘in which no man receives a scintilla of individual profit.’”58   
Today, section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code exempts a 
charitable organization from taxation provided that “no part of the net 
earnings of [the organization] inures to the benefit of any private 
shareholder or individual.”59 This statutory prohibition on private60 
inurement continues the long-standing public policy that a charity should 
 
 
 53. Id. at 586–92. 
 54. Id. See also Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. 539, 556 (1867). 
 55. Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909, ch. 6, sec. 38, 36 Stat. 112 (1909). 
 56. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 50, at 54. 
 57. Darryll K. Jones, The Scintilla of Individual Profit: In Search of Private Inurement and 
Excess Benefit, 19 VA. TAX REV. 575, 591 (2000) (quoting 44 CONG. REC. S4151 (1909) (statement of 
Sen. Bacon)). 
 58. Id. 
 59. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2010). 
 60. The word “private” in the context of private inurement has been defined by one court as “the 
antonym of ‘public’; a private stockholder, as distinguished from the general public, the supposed 
beneficiary of the benevolent activities of an institution devoted exclusively to public betterment.” 
Kemper Military School v. Crutchley, 274 F. 125, 127 (W.D. Mo. 1921). 
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benefit the public at large, not private individuals.
61
 Courts have held that 
the prohibition on private inurement is absolute.
62
 In fact, even small 
benefits that a charitable organization considers to be trivial may constitute 
private inurement and result in the revocation of the organization’s 
exemption.
63
 
Thus, because even a small amount of private inurement may result in 
revocation of the charity’s exemption, each part of the statute must be read 
closely. “Net earnings” is defined broadly and is generally considered to 
include any asset of the charity.
64
 The Treasury Regulations define the 
terms “private shareholder or individual” to refer to persons “having a 
personal and private interest in the activities of the organization.”65 
Similarly, “private shareholder[s] or individual[s]” generally have been 
considered by the courts to be founders or controlling members who are 
considered “insiders”—the equivalent of owners or managers—and are in 
control of the charity’s affairs.66 But because the test is “functional” and 
“looks to reality of control” rather than a person’s formal role within the 
charity, “insiders” are not necessarily limited to members of the charity’s 
board of directors or employees.
67
 As a matter of fact, the Service has 
made efforts to define insiders broadly.
68
 
Likewise, determining when an asset “inures to the benefit” of an 
insider is not always clear, but the Service and the courts have provided 
 
 
 61. Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Comm’r, 823 F.2d 1310, 1315–16 (9th Cir. 1987).  
 62. Id. at 1316.  
 63. In Spokane Motorcycle Club v. United States, 222 F. Supp. 151, 153–54 (E.D. Wash. 1963), 
the court revoked a social club’s charitable exemption because the club served refreshments to its 
members. The court held that, “although the amounts were not large, [it] must hold that the 
organization was not operated exclusively for . . . charitable . . . purposes and that part of the earnings 
of the organization did inure to the benefit of private individuals.” Id. at 154. 
 64. See Church of Scientology of Cal., 823 F.2d at 1316 (noting that “[c]ourts have construed 
broadly the term ‘net earnings’”); People of God Cmty. v. Comm’r, 75 T.C. 127, 133 (1980) (holding 
that “paying over a portion of gross earnings to those vested with the control of a charitable 
organization constitutes private inurement as well”); Harding Hosp., Inc. v. United States, 505 F.2d 
1068, 1072 (6th Cir. 1974) (“The phrase ‘net earnings’, [sic] as used in § 501(c)(3), may include ‘more 
than the term net profits as shown by the books of the organization or than the difference between the 
gross receipts and disbursements in dollars.’”) (quoting Nw. Mun. Ass’n v. United States, 99 F.2d 460, 
463 (8th Cir. 1938)). 
 65. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)-1(c) (2012).  
 66. See People of God Cmty., 75 T.C. at 133 (“[S]ection 501(c)(3) denies exempt status to an 
organization whose founders or controlling members have a personal stake in that organization’s 
receipts.”). See also United Cancer Council v. Comm’r, 165 F.3d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1999) (“A 
charity is not to siphon its earnings to its founder, or the members of its board, or their families, or 
anyone else fairly to be described as an insider, that is, as the equivalent of an owner or manager.”). 
 67. United Cancer Council, 165 F.3d at 1176.  
 68. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 at 7 (Nov. 22, 1991) (“[T]his Office [has] stated that all 
persons performing services for an organization have a personal and private interest in it, and therefore 
possess the requisite relationship to find inurement.”). 
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some guidance. Generally, private inurement may be found where an 
insider with financial control over a charitable organization is using the 
organization’s assets for the insider’s personal gain.69 For example, 
inurement will result where an insider is overcompensated by a charity for 
services or property, or the insider underpays the charity for services or 
property that the charity has provided to the insider.
70
 Yet, the prohibition 
against private inurement does not preclude a charity from paying its 
employees a reasonable salary.
71
 In determining whether an employee’s 
compensation violates the prohibition on private inurement, the Service 
usually will apply a facts and circumstances test in order to examine the 
compensation package as a whole.
72
 As part of its analysis, the Service 
will consider three factors: first, whether the compensation package is not 
simply a way to distribute profits to insiders; second, whether the 
compensation is the result of arm’s length bargaining; and third, whether 
the salary is reasonable when compared to individuals performing 
analogous functions at similar organizations.
73
 
B. Private Benefit 
The private benefit doctrine is generally considered to be the progeny 
of the common law rule that a charitable trust must serve an unselfish 
purpose and benefit a “sufficiently large and indefinite charitable class 
rather than specific private individuals.”74 Set out in the Treasury 
Regulations, the private benefit doctrine requires a charitable organization 
to serve “a public rather than a private interest” and “establish that it is not 
 
 
 69. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,459 at 7 (July 31, 1980) (“Inurement is likely to arise where 
the financial benefit represents a transfer of the organization’s financial resources to an individual 
solely by virtue of the individual’s relationship with the organization, and without regard to 
accomplishing exempt purposes.”). See also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 at 7 (Nov. 21, 1991) (“A 
charitable organization is viewed under the common law and the Internal Revenue Code as a trust 
whose assets must irrevocably be dedicated to achieving charitable purposes. The inurement 
prohibition serves to prevent anyone in a position to do so from siphoning off any of a charity’s 
income or assets for personal use.”). 
 70. John D. Colombo, In Search of Private Benefit, 58 FLA. L. REV. 1063, 1067–68 (2006). 
 71. World Family Corp. v. Comm’r, 81 T.C. 958, 969 (1983) (“The law places no duty on 
individuals operating charitable organizations to donate their services; they are entitled to reasonable 
compensation for their efforts.”). See also Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Comm’r, 823 F.2d 1310, 
1316 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Payment of reasonable salaries . . . does not constitute inurement. However, 
payment of excessive salaries will result in a finding of inurement. Inurement can also result from 
distributions other than the payment of excessive salaries. Unaccounted for diversions of . . . resources 
by one who has complete and unfettered control can constitute inurement.”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 72. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,670 (June 17, 1987). 
 73. Id. at 4–5. 
 74. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 2, at 459 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TRUSTS § 28 
(2003)).  
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organized or operated for the benefit of private interests such as designated 
individuals, the creator or his family, shareholders of the organization, or 
persons controlled, directly or indirectly, by such private interests.”75 
Thus, because a charity is not operating exclusively for exempt purposes if 
it is benefiting private individuals, the private benefit doctrine can be read 
into the statutory language of section 501(c)(3). Put differently, the private 
benefit doctrine in essence reiterates the statutory requirements of 
501(c)(3).
76
   
While the private inurement doctrine applies only to “insiders,” the 
private benefit doctrine “denies exemption when persons other than 
insiders receive more than an incidental ‘private benefit.’”77 A private 
benefit may include an “‘advantage; profit; fruit; privilege; gain; [or] 
interest.’”78 Also, where any amount of private inurement can be fatal, an 
“‘incidental’ amount of private benefit, viewed in a qualitative and 
quantitative sense, is not fatal.”79 Still, while an incidental benefit to a 
private individual may not jeopardize a charitable organization’s tax-
exempt status—provided the benefit is conferred in connection with an 
activity conducted in the pursuit of exempt purposes—if the activity 
constitutes more than an “insubstantial” part of an organization’s 
activities, the Service may not view the organization as operating 
“exclusively” for exempt purposes.80 
What is “insubstantial”? The courts and the Service have provided 
some guidance. The Tax Court has held that activities constituting less 
than ten percent of a charity’s total activities may be considered 
insubstantial.
81
 However, because the Tax Court applied a facts and 
circumstances test, this decision provides limited guidance to charities.
82
 
The Service defines insubstantial as “incidental” in both qualitative and 
quantitative senses.
83
 To be incidental in the qualitative sense, “the private 
benefit must be a necessary concomitant of the activity which benefits the 
public at large; in other words, the benefit to the public cannot be achieved 
 
 
 75. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (2012). 
 76. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 2, at 459. 
 77. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 2, at 458. 
 78. Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1053, 1065–66 (1989) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Retired Teachers Legal Fund v. Comm’r, 78 T.C. 280, 286 (1982)). 
 79. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 2, at 458–59. 
 80. See World Family Corp. v. Comm’r, 81 T.C. 958 (1983). See also Am. Campaign Acad., 92 
T.C. at 1066 (“Occasional economic benefits flowing to persons as an incidental consequence of an 
organization pursuing exempt charitable purposes will not generally constitute prohibited private 
benefits.”). 
 81. World Family Corp., 81 T.C. at 966–67.  
 82. Id. 
 83. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,789 at 3 (Dec. 18, 1978).  
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without necessarily benefiting certain private individuals.”84 The 
quantitative analysis measures any private benefit against the public 
benefit and requires that any private benefit be insubstantial.
85
 
C. Intermediate Sanctions 
Recognizing the limitations of the private inurement doctrine,
86
 in 1996 
Congress created an intermediate sanctions regime.
87
 They did so largely 
for two reasons: first, to provide the Service with greater flexibility when 
seeking corrective action where individuals have received an “excess 
benefit”; second, to provide an imposable rule.88 The intermediate 
sanctions regime, found in Section 4958 of the Code, allows the Service to 
sanction the person or persons who are responsible for providing the 
private inurement—as well as those who have received it—without 
revoking a charity’s exemption, which is considered a draconian measure 
and is rarely deployed.
89
 While section 4958 sanctions are ordinarily 
imposed in lieu of revocation, the Service may still revoke a charity’s 
exemption when appropriate.
90
 
Under the intermediate sanctions regime, when a “disqualified person” 
benefits from an “excess benefit transaction” with an “applicable tax-
exempt organization,” the disqualified person will be liable for an initial 
penalty of 25 percent of the excess benefit
91—a relatively high excise tax 
for an initial infraction.
92
 A disqualified person is any person in a position 
 
 
 84. Id. See Ginsberg v. Comm’r, 46 T.C. 47 (1966). See also Rev. Rul. 70-186, 1970-1 C.B. 129. 
 85. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,789 at 3–4 (Dec. 18, 1978). 
 86. The private inurement doctrine was viewed as a drastic and often inappropriate remedy, 
particularly where an organization was punished—through the loss of its exemption—for the 
wrongdoing of one particular individual. See MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT 
ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 252–53 (2009). Also, the uncertainty 
surrounding the scope of the private inurement doctrine created enforcement problems for the Service. 
FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 2, at 461. 
 87. Section 4958 is modeled after the omnibus private foundation reforms passed in 1969, 
although the sanctions and restrictions may be described as more lenient. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra 
note 86, at 253. See also FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 2, at 462. 
 88. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 86, at 253. 
 89. Id. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 2, at 461 (describing testimony from IRS 
Commissioner Margaret Richardson to Congress in which she observed the disproportionality that can 
result from the revocation of an organization’s exemption where only minor or isolated instances of 
inurement have occurred). See also Spokane Motorcycle Club v. United States, 222 F. Supp. 151, 153–
54 (E.D. Wash. 1963) (organization’s exemption was revoked because members received lunch and a 
snack). 
 90. FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 2, at 462. 
 91. I.R.C. § 4858 (2010). 
 92. The high penalty could be because these infractions are considered to be particularly 
egregious or because it’s unlikely the IRS will revoke the charity’s tax exemption. If not corrected in 
the taxable period (60 days), the tax goes up (200%). I.R.C. § 4958(b) (2010). The shortness of the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
238 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:227 
 
 
 
 
to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of the applicable tax-
exempt organization within a five-year period ending on the date of the 
inappropriate transaction.
93
 An “excess benefit transaction” is a transaction 
in which a tax-exempt organization provides an economic benefit directly 
or indirectly to or for the use of a disqualified person, and the value of the 
economic benefit provided exceeds the value of the consideration 
(including the performance of services) received for providing the 
benefit.
94
 An applicable tax-exempt organization is an organization exempt 
under section 501(c)(3) or 501(c)(4),
95
 not including private foundations.
96
  
With “disqualified persons” rules, the Service was attempting to clarify 
exactly who is or is not an “insider.”97 The classification scheme is 
comprehensive. Those classified as disqualified persons include: 
(1) “[v]oting members of the governing body;” (2) officers, such as 
presidents and chief executive officers, with the “ultimate responsibility 
for implementing the decisions of the governing body, or . . . supervising 
the management, administration, or operation of the organization;” and 
(3) officers, such as treasurers and chief financial officers, with the 
“ultimate responsibility for managing the finances of the organization.”98 
Close family members of disqualified persons are also included as 
disqualified persons.
99
 Outside of the certain enumerated categories, the 
determination of whether a person is a disqualified person rests on a facts 
and circumstances test, with certain factors related to control and financial 
influence weighing into the calculation.
100
 
 
 
taxable period arguably coerces a disqualified person to pay the initial tax. Generally, a disqualified 
person may correct the excess benefit by returning the charity to the financial position it would have 
been in had the improper transaction or transactions not occurred. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra 
note 2, at 462–63. Managers who knowingly and willfully participate in an excess benefit transaction 
without reasonable cause may be liable for an excise tax equal to ten percent of the excise benefit. 
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-1(a) (2002). 
 93. I.R.C. § 4958(f)(1) (2010); Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(a)(1) (2002). 
 94. I.R.C. § 4958(c)(1)(A) (2010); Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(a)(1) (2002).  
 95. Section 501(c)(4) exempts from taxation “[c]ivic leagues or organizations not organized for 
profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare.” I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)(A) (2010). 
These organizations are commonly referred to as “social welfare organizations.” Social welfare 
organizations are a popular corporate form for organizations that desire tax-exempt status and may 
have some sort of loosely defined charitable cause, but more often than not seek to engage in 
significant political or lobbying activities that would preclude them from securing 501(c)(3) status. For 
a discussion on section 501(c)(4) organizations, see generally FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 2, at 
532–36.   
 96. Additionally, the Code includes a provision that covers any organization that would have 
been an applicable tax-exempt organization at any time during a five-year look back period ending on 
the date of the transaction. I.R.C. § 4958(e)(1)–(2) (2010). 
 97. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3 (2002). 
 98. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(c) (2002).  
 99. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(b) (2002).  
 100. Factors suggesting a person exercises substantial influence over an organization include 
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III. TWO CASE STUDIES 
In this Part, I will analyze two cases demonstrating the application of 
and distinctions between the private inurement and private benefit 
doctrines. The first, United Cancer Council v. Commissioner,
101
 is a well-
known Seventh Circuit opinion written by then Chief Judge Richard 
Posner. The second, Capital Gymnastics Booster Club v. Commissioner,
102
 
is a recent Tax Court decision.  
A. United Cancer Council v. Commissioner 
United Cancer Council v. Commissioner
103
 exemplifies the confusion 
that can result from the inconsistent application of the private inurement 
and private benefit doctrines. In 1984, the United Cancer Council (UCC) 
was a small, struggling charity
104
 on the brink of bankruptcy. In an effort 
to raise the funds necessary for its survival, the UCC board entered into a 
contract with Watson & Hughey (W & H), a fundraising company. 
Because of UCC’s weak position, W & H negotiated very favorable 
contract terms, which included: (1) an exclusive five-year contract; (2) co-
ownership of the prospective donor list generated by the fundraising 
campaign; and (3) restrictions on the UCC that prevented it from ever 
selling or leasing the prospective donor list generated by the fundraising 
campaign. In return, W & H agreed to fund the costs associated with the 
fundraising campaign.
105
 
The W & H campaign raised an astonishing amount of money—nearly 
$29 million. However, $26.5 million went to W & H to reimburse it for its 
fundraising expenses and presumably to compensate it.
106
 Only $2.3 
million went directly to UCC’s charitable efforts.107 When the contract 
 
 
circumstances where the person: (1) “founded the organization;” (2) “is a substantial contributor” 
(more than $5000 if such amount is more than two percent of the total contributions before the close of 
taxable year in which the donation is received); (3) receives compensation “primarily based on 
revenues” from the organization’s activities; (4) “has or shares authority to control or determine a 
substantial portion of the organization’s capital expenditures, operating budget, or compensation for 
employees;” or (5) “manages a discrete segment or activity of the organization that represents a 
substantial portion of the [organization’s] activities, assets, income, or expenses.” Treas. Reg. 
§ 53.4958-3(e)(2) (2002). Factors suggesting a person does not exercise substantial influence over an 
organization include circumstances where the person “does not participate in any management 
decisions affecting the organization.” Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(e)(3) (2002).  
 101. 165 F.3d 1173 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 102. T.C.M. (RIA) 2013-193. 
 103. 165 F.3d 1173 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 104. UCC’s annual operating budget was $35,000. Id. at 1175. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. UCC spent $2.3 million “for services to cancer patients and on research for the prevention 
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with W & H expired in 1989, UCC did not renew it, but instead hired 
another fundraising company.
108
 Within a year, UCC declared bankruptcy, 
and the Service retroactively revoked UCC’s exemption to 1984 when 
UCC signed the contract with W & H.
109
 
The Service based its revocation on its belief that UCC had ceased to 
operate exclusively for charitable purposes and was instead operated for 
the private benefit of W & H.
110
 The Service also claimed that part of 
UCC’s net earnings inured to the benefit of W & H.111 The Tax Court 
upheld the Service’s revocation purely on the grounds of private 
inurement and did not rule on the private benefit claim.
112
 
The Service and the Tax Court argued that the particular terms and 
circumstances of UCC’s contract with W & H were so favorable as to 
make W & H an “insider” of the charity, thus triggering the private 
inurement clause of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
113
 The Service’s argument for 
private inurement as a result of the particular terms and circumstances of 
the contract applied the following logic. First, because UCC was nearly 
insolvent at the time of the contract and W & H provided the initial 
fundraising expenses, W & H acted like a founder or co-founder. Second, 
W & H was in effect the real beneficiary of the fundraising efforts because 
it received 90% of the contributions. Third, as a result of the exclusive 
contract, W & H seized control of UCC and UCC was therefore at the 
mercy of W & H. Fourth, UCC surrendered its rights to rent out the list of 
donors generated by W & H. Finally, the contractual terms were more 
favorable than the average fundraising contract.
114
 
This was not the first time the Service denied or revoked exemption to 
a charity on the basis that the contractual terms between a fundraiser and a 
charity were so one-sided as to constitute both a private inurement and 
private benefit.
115
 In Senior Citizens of Missouri, Inc. v. Commissioner, the 
Service denied exemption to a charity that hired independent contractors to 
solicit funds for the charity through telephone solicitation.
116
 The charity 
paid the solicitors both advances (more than 33% of gross income) and 
 
 
and treatment of cancer.” Id. But because the fundraising letters distributed by W & H contained 
advice about preventing cancer—an educational activity—UCC was permitted to classify $12.2 
million of its fundraising expenses as charitable expenditures. Id.  
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 1176. 
 110. Id. at 1174–75.  
 111. Id. at 1175. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 1176.  
 114. Id. 
 115. See Senior Citizens of Mo., Inc. v. Comm’r, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 480 (1988). 
 116. Id. at *1-3. 
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commissions (25% of gross income) such that the commissions and 
advances were equal to nearly 60% of the charity’s gross income.117 The 
charity used less than 10% of its gross income to further its exempt 
purposes.
118
 
The Tax Court upheld the Service’s denial of the charity’s application 
for tax exemption, based solely on a private benefit analysis.
119
 Focusing 
purely on the advances paid to the solicitors,
120
 the Tax Court found that 
the charity failed not only to establish that the advances were paid for 
services performed, but also to explain the criteria used for determining 
the amount paid in advances to each solicitor.
121
 Because the advances did 
not further an exempt purpose and were not insubstantial,
122
 the Tax Court 
held that the charity failed the operational test of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
Unlike in Senior Citizens of Missouri, Inc., the Tax Court in United 
Cancer Commission relied exclusively on the private inurement doctrine 
and did not rule on the Service’s private benefit charges.123 In the Seventh 
Circuit’s opinion, then-Chief Judge Posner seemed to imply that had the 
Tax Court ruled for the Service on the private benefit charge, he might 
have upheld it.
124
 On the private inurement charge, however, Judge Posner 
reversed the Tax Court.
125
 Regarding the Service’s five-point argument for 
inurement, Judge Posner stated, “these points bear no relation that we can 
see to the inurement provision.”126  
With respect to the Service’s first point—that because UCC was nearly 
insolvent at the time of the contract and W & H paid the fundraising 
 
 
 117. Id. at *2. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at *3-5. 
 120. The administrative record focused purely on the advances. Id. at *3. 
 121. Id. at *4. 
 122. “Petitioner paid unexplained advances representing 33.2 percent of its gross revenues. We 
find this to be clearly substantial, especially when considering that petitioner spent only 8.9 percent of 
gross revenues on dinners, picnics and other activities for the elderly.” Id. at *5. 
 123. See United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Commissioner, 109 T.C. 326, 381–400 (1997). 
 124.  
[T]he board of a charity has a duty of care, just like the board of an ordinary business 
corporation, and a violation of that duty which involved the dissipation of the charity’s assets 
might (we need not decide whether it would—we leave that issue to the Tax Court in the first 
instance) support a finding that the charity was conferring a private benefit, even if the 
contracting party did not control, or exercise undue influence over, the charity. This, for all 
we know, may be such a case. 
United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Commissioner, 165 F.3d 1173, 1180 (7th Cir. 1999) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 125. Id. at 1179. 
 126. Id. at 1176. Judge Posner posits that the private inurement provision “is designed to prevent 
the siphoning of charitable receipts to insiders of the charity, not to empower the IRS to monitor the 
terms of arm’s length contracts made by charitable organizations with the firms that supply them with 
essential inputs, whether premises, paper, computers, legal advice, or fundraising services.” Id. 
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expenses, W & H acted like a founder or co-founder—Judge Posner 
argued that accepting the Service’s argument “would deny the charitable 
tax exemption to any new or small charity that wanted to grow by 
soliciting donations, since it would have to get the cash to pay for the 
solicitations from an outside source, logically a fundraising 
organization.”127 While admitting that the Service’s second point—that 
because W & H received ninety percent of the contributions it was the real 
beneficiary—“ha[d] the most intuitive appeal,” Judge Posner reasoned that 
UCC received a charitable “bang” from the mailings due to their 
educational content.
128
 Judge Posner also reasoned that such a comparison 
(gross expenses to net receipts) was like comparing “a ratio of apples to 
oranges” and because W & H’s total expenses were unknown, the high 
ratio of W & H’s expenses to UCC’s net charitable receipts was a difficult 
issue to determine without knowing the amount of W & H’s profit.129  
To the Service’s third point—that the exclusive contract gave W & H 
effective control of UCC—Judge Posner argued that there was “nothing 
that corporate or agency law would recognize as control.”130 Furthermore, 
Judge Posner argued that “[i]f UCC had hired ten fundraisers, the Service 
couldn’t argue that any of them was so large a recipient of the charity’s 
expenditures that it must be deemed to have controlled the charity.”131 
Moreover, Judge Posner noted that (1) the exclusive contract was meant to 
protect W&H’s investment;132 (2) W&H only funded UCC at the 
beginning;
133
 (3) W & H had a contractual obligation to put forth its best 
 
 
 127. Id. at 1177. 
 128. Id. at 1177–78. 
 129. Id. at 1178. Judge Posner stated “[T]he ratio of expenses to net charitable receipts is 
unrelated to the issue of inurement.” Id. at 1178. This statement is at odds with the Tax Court, which 
considered the ratio of fundraising expenses to net charitable receipts in Senior Citizens of Missouri, 
Inc. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 480 (1988). Also, it is at odds with the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding in Church of Scientology of California v. Commissioner, 823 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1987), where 
the Court utilized a “cumulative effect” approach to considering whether Church payments on behalf 
of founder L. Ron Hubbard constituted inurement. The Court did not directly rule on whether salaries 
and living expenses paid to Hubbard and his family constituted inurement, but it held that “the 
cumulative effect of Hubbard’s use of the Church to promote royalty income, Hubbard’s unfettered 
control over millions of dollars of church assets, and his receipt of untold thousands of dollars worth of 
‘debt repayments’ strongly demonstrate[d] inurement.” Id. at 1319. Thus, the law may not be as clear 
on this issue (that the ratio of expenses paid to a third party to the net charitable receipts of a charity is 
unrelated to the issue of inurement) as Judge Posner has written.   
 130. United Cancer Council, Inc., 165 F.3d at 1178. 
 131. Id. at 1177. 
 132. Id. (“W & H obtained an exclusive contract . . . not because it sought to control UCC and 
suck it dry, but because it was taking a risk; the exclusive contract lent assurance that if the venture 
succeeded, UCC wouldn’t hire other fundraisers to reap where W & H had sown.”). 
 133. Id. (“[I]t was only at the beginning of the contract period that W & H was funding UCC. As 
donations poured into the charity’s coffers as a result of the success of the fundraising campaign, the 
charity began paying for the subsequent stages of the campaign out of its own revenues.”). 
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good-faith fundraising efforts;
134
 and (4) the fact that W & H controlled an 
escrow account was “a detail.”135  
Regarding the Service’s final points—that UCC surrendered its rights 
to rent out the list of donors generated by W & H, and in sum, the terms 
were more favorable than the average fundraising contract—Judge Posner 
argued that the Service failed to understand the subtle differences in the 
value of a “housefile”136 to a fundraiser and to a charity. Further, he noted 
that the simple reason for the markedly one-sided contract was that UCC 
was “desperate.”137 Thus, Judge Posner reversed the Tax Court and 
remanded with instructions for the court to consider the Service’s private 
benefit basis for revoking UCC’s exemption.138  
The facts in United Cancer Council suggest that the charity was no 
longer operating for a public benefit. But by ruling only on the private 
inurement charge, the Tax Court handcuffed Judge Posner. His application 
of the private inurement doctrine is correct. The doctrine is limited to 
“insiders.” Accordingly, no matter how one-sided the contract between 
UCC and W & H was, it likely did not make W & H “insiders” for at least 
three reasons. First, there was no prior relationship between the two 
entities. Second, the contract was negotiated at arm’s length. Third, the 
favorable terms of the contract were the result of UCC being flat on its 
back and in a comprised position from a bargaining standpoint.  
However, it would be useful for our purposes in this Note to apply the 
private benefit doctrine to the facts of United Cancer Council. Whether 
UCC passes the private benefit test likely turns on how the $12.2 million 
of fundraising expenses the charity classified as educational expenditures 
are treated. Without examining the letters to deem the value of the 
educational materials, it is difficult to know for certain, but, it is fairly 
clear that the primary purpose of the letters was fundraising. Therefore, the 
value of the charitable benefit is questionable. If the $12.2 million is 
 
 
 134. Id. (“When a firm is granted an exclusive contract, the law reads into it an obligation that the 
firm use its best efforts to promote the contract’s objectives.”). 
 135. Id. (“[T]his is a detail; the important point is that UCC did not receive repeated infusions of 
capital from W & H.”). 
 136.  
The housefile’s value to a charity is . . . a list of people who are good prospects to respond 
favorably to future solicitations. Its value to the fundraiser is quite different. The fundraiser is 
not a charity. The value to it of a housefile that it has created is the possibility of marketing it 
(as a prospect file—but as a prospect file in which all the prospects are charitable donors 
rather than a mere cross-section of potential donors) to another charity that hires it. 
Id. 
 137. Id. at 1178.  
 138. Id. at 1179–80. Before the Tax Court could reconsider the case, the two parties settled. See 
Errol Copilevitz, Looking Back to Assess the United Cancer Council Case, 13 JTXEO 63, *66 (2001). 
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excluded, the proportion of donated funds dedicated to furthering UCC’s 
exempt purposes is less than 10%, with more than 90% of the donated 
funds going to W & H. From a quantitative standpoint, this likely fails the 
private benefit test. The facts in United Cancer Council are analogous to 
those of IRS Revenue Ruling 76-152,
139
 where the Service ruled that an art 
gallery that turned over 90% of all its sales proceeds was not operated 
exclusively for an exempt purpose.
140
 More than 90% of UCC’s donated 
funds went to W & H. Whether those funds went to defraying W & H’s 
costs or not, with less than 10% of UCC’s raised funds going directly 
towards pursuing its charitable purposes, it was likely no longer being 
operated exclusively for charitable purposes. Yet, without being able to 
examine the fundraising letters and evaluate their educational content, it is 
difficult to make a definitive determination.  
 
 
 139. Rev. Rul. 76-152, 1976-1 C.B. 152. 
 140.  
[T]he artists in the subject case are being directly benefited by the exhibition and sale of their 
works, with the result that a major activity of the organization is serving the private interests 
of those artists whose works are displayed for sale. Since ninety percent of all sales proceeds 
are turned over to the individual artists, such direct benefits are substantial by any measure 
and the organization’s provision of them cannot be dismissed as being merely incidental to its 
other purposes and activities. 
Id. at *2. 
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B. Capital Gymnastics Booster Club v. Commissioner 
While wafts of impropriety abound United Cancer Council, the initial 
odor of the facts in Capital Gymnastics Booster Club v. Commissioner
141
 
is not particularly unpleasant. Capital Gymnastics Booster Club was a 
small charity formed to provide financial support to young athletes 
(fostering sports competition under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)) who participated 
on teams at a local private gym.
142
 Capital Gymnastics collected annual 
assessments from the parents of the young athletes.
143
 These assessments 
were used to cover entry fees for meets and to offset travel expenditures 
for the coaches of the gymnastics teams.
144
 The fees ranged from $600 to 
$1400 per athlete depending on skill level.
145
 
Families could satisfy the annual assessment either by paying cash or 
by participating in a fundraising program that awarded “points” towards 
the annual assessment.
146
 The amount raised was credited against the 
athlete’s assessment. Approximately 46% of the families participated in 
the fundraising program in 2003, and the fundraising generated a net profit 
of $35,326.
147
 Capital Gymnastics used 93% of the profit to reduce the 
annual assessments, on average, by 50 to 70% for the families who 
fundraised. It did not credit any of the profit against the assessments of 
athletes whose families did not fundraise. The Service revoked Capital 
Gymnastics’ exemption, claiming that the charity “had failed to establish 
that its income ‘did not inure to the benefit of private individuals and 
shareholders, which is prohibited by I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).’”148 
Capital Gymnastics, conceding that the parents were “insiders,” 
claimed that its method of fundraising did not violate the private 
inurement prohibition because the charity “‘never pa[id] money to any of 
its members’ and instead spen[t] its funds ‘exclusively on competition-
related expenses of the athletes.’”149 Capital Gymnastics argued that the 
“true recipient of its generosity was not the parents but instead ‘a well-
defined charitable class’ of ‘school age children competing on the Training 
Center’s amateur gymnastics and power tumbling teams.’”150 This was a 
 
 
 141. T.C.M. (RIA) 2013-193. 
 142. Id. at 3–4. 
 143. Id. at 5–6. 
 144. Id. at 6. 
 145. Id. at 5. 
 146. Id. at 6–9. 
 147. Id. at 9. 
 148. Id. at 11. 
 149. Id. at 17. Capital Gymnastics further argued that its “‘unequal sharing of fundraising profits’” 
did not constitute private inurement because it was not a “‘constructive distribution.’” Id. 
 150. Id. at 17–18. 
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savvy argument, if not a successful one. Although Capital Gymnastics 
argued that parents fundraised because they “needed the money,” the club 
failed to offer any supporting evidence.
151
 Capital Gymnastics argued it 
was “‘inconceivable that Congress could have intended such an absurd 
result’ as to prohibit booster clubs from spending any part of their earnings 
for the benefit of the children who are on an athletic team.”152  
The Service conceded that Capital Gymnastics, as a charity dedicated 
to fostering amateur sports competition, passed the organizational test for 
exemption.
153
 The Service also conceded that Capital Gymnastics’ amateur 
athletes were “members of a charitable class.”154 But the Service objected 
to the fact “that ‘almost all of petitioner’s fundraised proceeds are 
earmarked to benefit those individuals who fundraised.’”155 Therefore, the 
Service argued that the arrangement violated the private inurement and 
private benefit doctrines “because the methodology further[ed] private 
interests rather than the team or the organization as a whole.”156 
The Tax Court held that Capital Gymnastics’ fundraising arrangement 
allowed “substantial private inurement” to the parents who fundraised and 
therefore conferred an “impermissible substantial private benefit” on the 
young athletes of only those parents.
157
 Further, the Tax Court stressed that 
rather than benefiting all the young athletes in its programs, the 
fundraising program benefited only the children of parents who 
fundraised.
158
 In reaching its decision, the Tax Court considered the 
following facts and circumstances. First, unlike “a school band’s sale of 
candy or a church youth group’s carwash for a once-a-year event,” the 
fundraising was the primary function of the organization.
159
 Second, the 
assessments were not optional nor were scholarships made available to 
those unable to pay.
160
 Third, the fundraising was optional as opposed to 
mandated.
161
 And, fourth, the assessments were large obligations—not the 
type of “de minimis charges that might be covered by a child’s paper route 
or babysitting.”162  
The Tax Court continued its analysis by examining Capital 
 
 
 151. Id. at 18. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 19. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 19–20. 
 158. Id. at 20. 
 159. Id.  
 160. Id.  
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
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Gymnastics’ fundraising method, which it determined was unacceptable 
because the financial benefits of the charity were focused directly on, and 
self-selected, by the members.
163
 Furthermore, “Capital Gymnastics made 
no showing that the parent-members who received its fundraising ‘points’ 
(i.e., the parents who did fundraising) were actually poor, disadvantaged, 
in financial distress, or otherwise members of any charitable class.”164 
Finally, the Tax Court held that the “‘points’ were as good as dollars”165 
and that “[t]he benefit that Capital Gymnastics conferred on fundraising 
families was hardly insubstantial.”166 
Capital Gymnastics presents an interesting question concerning the 
application of the private benefit doctrine. Were the parent’s fundraising 
activities “incidental” to its stated primary purpose: fostering amateur 
athletics, a statutorily recognized public benefit? The Tax Court held that 
fundraising was the primary purpose of the organization. Yet the 
determination of whether a benefit is substantial or insubstantial is an 
unsettled area of the private benefit doctrine.
167
  
I argue that the private benefit analysis in the Capital Gymnastics is 
essentially moot, however, because it is difficult to argue that the private 
inurement prohibition was not violated. It is not contested that the parents 
were insiders. Putting aside the charitable class arguments presented in the 
case (and conceding that the parents, and not the children, were the true 
beneficiaries), it could be argued that the parents received income through 
the discharge of a financial obligation they incurred once their children 
participated in the team’s gymnastics activities.168 It also could be argued 
that under the Haig-Simons economic definition of income,
169
 the parents 
received income based on the consumption of gymnastics activities by 
their children. Whether the market cost of the gymnastics activities was 
paid in cash by the parents or discharged in the form of points, the parents 
consumed the activities on behalf of their children and therefore realized 
income. Thus, as insiders, the parents were in violation of the private 
 
 
 163. Id. at 21–22.  
 164. Id. at 23. 
 165. Id. at 23.  
 166. Id. at 24 (“Capital Gymnastics’ figures are substantial both in absolute terms and in relative 
terms. By comparison, in Wendy L. Parker Rehab. Found., Inc., a smaller amount of inurement—i.e., 
30% of that foundation’s $7,500 in income—was still large enough to constitute substantial 
inurement.”). 
 167. See supra Part II.B. 
 168. See Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm’r, 279 U.S. 716 (1929). 
 169. The Haig-Simons economic definition of income defines income “as the sum of the 
taxpayer’s consumption plus change in net worth, each defined in terms of market value during some 
specified accounting period (such as a taxable year).” See JOSEPH BANKMAN, DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, & 
KIRK J. STARK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 13 (16th ed. 2012). 
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inurement doctrine. 
But was the revocation of Capital Gymnastics’ tax-exempt status a just 
result? It is difficult to reconcile the respective outcomes of United Cancer 
Council and Capital Gymnastics. In United Cancer Council, UCC was 
found to have not violated the private inurement doctrine because W & H 
was not an insider. The Tax Court did not rule on the private benefit claim, 
so Judge Posner could not consider it. Thus, some might argue—fairly—
that UCC kept its tax-exempt status because of technicalities. 
Contrast Capital Gymnastics, where some might argue—also fairly—
that Capital Gymnastics lost its tax-exempt status because of 
technicalities. If all the parents had fundraised and all the parents had 
received a discount on their dues, it is unlikely there would have been any 
question about the booster club’s tax-exempt status. But because only the 
parents who fundraised received a financial benefit not afforded to the 
general public, Capital Gymnastics’ tax-exempt status was revoked. 
The results in United Cancer Council and Capital Gymnastics are 
legally sound. The private inurement and private benefit doctrines were 
correctly applied. Yet the results are not morally intuitive, and this begs 
the question why. Perhaps a consolidated, simplified doctrine could apply 
the letter of the law without imposing drastic, draconian sanctions on those 
who are still promoting an underlying charitable good. 
IV. CONSOLIDATING THE PERPLEXITIES OF THE PRIVATE INUREMENT AND 
PRIVATE BENEFIT DOCTRINES 
There are several arguments for consolidating the private inurement 
and private benefit doctrines into one cohesive doctrine. First, the private 
inurement doctrine is murky and subject to inconsistent application. 
Second, the private inurement doctrine is redundant, because it has largely 
been supplanted by the intermediate sanctions regime and may be 
subsumed within the private benefit doctrine. Third, a consolidation of the 
two doctrines will result in judicial economy. I will discuss these 
arguments in order.   
My first argument for consolidating the private inurement and private 
benefit doctrines is that the private inurement doctrine is murky and 
inconsistently applied. Conventional wisdom dictates that the private 
inurement and private benefit doctrines differ in two respects. First, an 
incidental amount of private benefit is not fatal to an organization’s 
exemption, whereas even the slightest amount of private inurement may 
lead to revocation of an organization’s exemption. Second, the private 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss1/10
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inurement doctrine applies only to “insiders,” whereas the private benefit 
doctrine may be applied to non-insider persons.
170
  
However, neither the absolute prohibition, nor the insider distinction is 
clear in practice. For example, although the statutory proscription against 
private inurement is complete, courts have considered the amount of 
private inurement in determining whether to revoke a charity’s 
exemption.
171
 It is not clear whether this means a court might accept an 
incidental amount of private inurement in certain circumstances. In fact, 
some courts have held that any amount of inurement is prohibited.
172
 And 
it would not be unprecedented for the literal language of the Internal 
Revenue Code to mean something else in practical application. To cite but 
one example, the literal language of section 501(c)(3) states that an 
organization must be organized and operated “exclusively” for charitable 
purposes; however, the Treasury Regulations clarify that “exclusively” 
means “primarily.”173 Similarly, the technical language of the private 
inurement doctrine applies only to insiders, but exactly who may qualify 
as an insider is unclear because the test looks to “reality of control.”174 
Professor Darryll Jones has written that such uncertainty surrounding the 
private inurement doctrine has led it to be “applied in vague, non-literal, 
and inconsistent ways.”175 And Professor Henry Hansmann has argued that 
the “vagueness of the statutory language” may in fact have resulted in 
limited policing efforts by the Service.
176
 The lack of clarity regarding 
whether the proscription is indeed absolute—or is subject to some 
leniency—and the lack of clarity regarding whom qualifies as an insider 
(as evidenced in the United Cancer Council case) result in a private 
inurement doctrine that is nebulous and confused. This confusion could be 
resolved by subsuming the private inurement doctrine within the private 
benefit doctrine, which considers qualitative and quantitative factors rather 
than an absolute prohibition and includes no insider requirement. 
My second argument for the consolidation of the private inurement and 
private benefit doctrines is to remove two redundancies. First, the passage 
of I.R.C. § 4958 and the intermediate sanctions regime has given the 
 
 
 170. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 86, at 250–51. See also HOPKINS, supra note 30, at 537. 
 171. See Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Comm’r, 823 F.2d 1310, 1315–16 (9th Cir. 1987).  
 172. Spokane Motorcycle Club v. United States, 222 F. Supp. 151, 153 (E.D. Wash. 1963). 
 173. Contrast the language of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) with that in Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1), 
which states, “An organization will be regarded as operated exclusively for one or more exempt 
purposes only if it engages primarily in activities which accomplish one or more of such exempt 
purposes specified in section 501(c)(3).” Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (2012). 
 174. United Cancer Council v. Comm’r, 165 F.3d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 175. Jones, supra note 57, at 580 n.16 (surveying the literature and concluding that the private 
inurement doctrine “is applied in vague, non-literal, and inconsistent ways”). 
 176. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, supra note 15, at 603. 
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Service a more effective policing tool for dealing with “insiders” that has 
largely supplanted the private inurement doctrine and rendered it a 
redundant and cumbersome alternative.
177
 As a result, the vagueness of the 
private inurement doctrine has been replaced with a regime that features 
clear, extensive definitions and penalties that can be enforced directly on 
bad actors without revoking the organization’s exemption absent 
warranted circumstances. 
In addition, courts have opined on the redundancies of the private 
inurement doctrine. Their arguments generally turn on the fact that the 
private inurement doctrine may be subsumed within the private benefit 
doctrine.
178
 Despite the private benefit doctrine’s roots in the common law, 
both doctrines flow directly from the statute, which requires a charity to be 
organized and operated exclusively for an exempt purpose.
179
 While the 
private inurement doctrine is explicitly spelled out, the private benefit 
prohibition may be read into the statute and “is but another way of 
requiring that an organization be operated exclusively for tax-exempt 
purposes, i.e., for public benefit.”180 Similarly, if a charity is in violation of 
the private inurement doctrine by operating for the direct benefit of an 
insider, such as the creator of the charity or members of the creator’s 
family, the charity is then also not operating exclusively for an exempt 
purpose.
181
 Furthermore, a close examination of the Treasury Regulations 
thought to create the modern private benefit doctrine
182
 reveals a section 
that appears very similar to the “insider” requirements of the private 
inurement doctrine.
183
 Thus, if an organization is violating the private 
 
 
 177. See Colombo, supra note 70, at 1068 (“Today, the private inurement limitation largely has 
been supplanted by I.R.C. § 4958 (what was once known as the ‘intermediate sanctions’ legislation), 
which provides statutory remedies short of loss of tax exemption for these siphoning transactions.”). 
See also FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 2, at 445–46 (“Congress gave the Service a new and more 
effective weapon in 1996 when it enacted the § 4958 intermediate sanctions regime.”). 
 178. See W. Catholic Church v. Comm’r, 73 T.C. 196, 209 n.27 (1979) (“The prohibition against 
private inurement of net earnings appears redundant, since such a benefit would be inconsistent with 
operating exclusively for an exempt purpose.”). See also Unitary Mission Church of Long Island v. 
Comm’r, 74 T.C. 507, 512 n.7 (1980) (“We have previously commented that the separately stated 
private inurement prohibition is redundant to the requirement that an organization be operated 
exclusively for one or more exempt purpose since operating exclusively for an exempt purpose 
necessitates providing a public, and not private, benefit.”). 
 179. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2010). 
 180. Western Catholic Church, 73 T.C. at 213. See also Alive Fellowship of Harmonious Living 
v. Comm’r, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 1134 (1984). 
 181. Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1053, 1065 (1989) (“When an organization 
operates for the benefit of private interests such as designated individuals, the creator or his family, 
shareholders of the organization, or persons controlled, directly or indirectly, by such private interests, 
the organization by definition does not operate exclusively for exempt purposes.”). 
 182. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (2012). 
 183.  
On first glance, the language in [Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii)] would seem to be little 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss1/10
  
 
 
 
 
2014] A PATH TO “INURE” PEACE 251 
 
 
 
 
inurement doctrine, it is necessarily violating the private benefit 
doctrine.
184
 Although the reverse is not true,
185
 the private inurement 
doctrine is therefore redundant and may be subsumed within the private 
benefit doctrine.
186
 
My final argument for consolidating the private inurement and private 
benefit doctrines is that such a consolidation will result in judicial 
economy. As evidenced in the United Cancer Council case, if a lower 
court bases its decision solely on a private inurement analysis, it can 
foreclose an appellate judge from considering a private benefit analysis, 
thus causing major inefficiency.
187
 Because both prohibitions require 
consideration of similar facts and circumstances, courts have expressed a 
preference for considering and discussing the doctrines together.
188
 The 
 
 
more than an augmented explanation of the statutory private inurement limitation. For 
example, when the regulation states that an exempt charity must not be ‘organized or operated 
for the benefit of private interests such as designated individuals, the creator or his family, 
shareholders of the organization, or persons controlled, directly or indirectly, by such private 
interests,’ it appears that the regulation is discussing mostly insiders of the organization: the 
creator, shareholders, or parties controlled by them. Indeed, the classic ejusdem generis 
maxim of statutory interpretation would call for the general term in this regulation (“private 
interests”) to be limited by the expression of the specific examples, which are designated 
individuals, the creator and shareholders, all words that seem to convey an insider 
relationship with the entity. Perhaps because Treasury Regulation § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) refers 
more explicitly to inurement, however, the IRS over the past thirty years has viewed the 
private benefit language as a separate limitation on exempt status. 
Colombo, supra note 70, at 1068–69. 
 184.  
[W]e have often observed that the prohibition against private inurement of net earnings 
appears redundant, since the inurement of earnings to an interested person or insider would 
constitute the conferral of a benefit inconsistent with operating exclusively for an exempt 
purpose. In other words, when an organization permits its net earnings to inure to the benefit 
of a private shareholder or individual, it transgresses the private inurement prohibition and 
operates for a nonexempt private purpose.  
Am. Campaign Acad., 92 T.C.at 1068 (internal citations omitted). 
 185. Because the private benefit doctrine applies to non-insider persons, it may not be subsumed 
within the private inurement doctrine. Colombo, supra note 70, at 1068–69. But, it is hard to see the 
benefit in trying to subsume private benefit within private inurement, because private benefit is 
broader and can sanction a wider array of non-exempt behavior. 
 186. Id. 
 187.  
It would have been better had the court resolved that ground [private benefit] as well as the 
inurement ground, so that the case could be definitively resolved in one appeal. But it did not, 
and so the case must be remanded to enable the court to consider it. We shall not prejudge the 
proceedings on remand.  
United Cancer Council v. Comm’r, 165 F.3d 1173, 1179 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 188.  
Although the requirement that an organization be operated exclusively for tax-exempt 
purposes (and not for a private benefit) is statutorily distinct from the prohibition against the 
inurement of net earnings to the benefit of private individuals, for convenience, both 
requirements will be discussed together because much of the evidence is applicable to both.  
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doctrines overlap: violation of either results in the furtherance of a non-
exempt purpose; both doctrines ensure the furtherance of a public and not 
a private interest; and private benefit subsumes private inurement.
189
 
Therefore, an approach that considers both doctrines together maximizes 
judicial economy. A consolidated doctrine will prevent situations like 
United Cancer Council, where the lower court fails to rule on one ground 
or the other. 
Moreover, at the nexus of the enterprise of judging lies fidelity to 
law.
190
 And, fundamental to fidelity to law is the precept that “like cases 
ought to be decided alike.”191 Subsuming the private inurement doctrine 
within the private benefit doctrine will establish a clear, yet broad 
foundation upon which judges can cautiously build within the boundaries 
of the larger legal system. All in all, there is one essential question that 
must be answered, regardless of whether someone is an insider: “is this 
charity exclusively serving a charitable purpose that merits continued tax 
exemption?” With this core principle in mind and a simplified scheme, 
judges stand a better chance of “deciding like cases alike” and achieving 
fidelity to law. 
CONCLUSION 
Much time and energy has been spent describing the differences 
between the private inurement and private benefit doctrines. It is fair to 
ask whether this time and energy may have been better spent consolidating 
 
 
W. Catholic Church v. Comm’r, 73 T.C. 196, 213 (1979). 
 189.  
If the organization engages in either inurement or private benefit, then the organization is 
furthering a non-exempt purpose. The prohibition against inurement, like the prohibition of 
private benefit, ensures that the exempt organization is serving a public and not a private 
interest, and the two prohibitions thus have a common purpose. And because ‘private benefit’ 
encompasses but is broader in scope than ‘inurement’, they overlap.  
Capital Gymnastics Booster Club, Inc. v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2013-193, *6 (internal citations 
omitted). 
 190. Russell K. Osgood, The Enterprise of Judging, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 13, 14–15 
(1994).  
 191. Id. at 14. 
Fidelity to law is the core of the enterprise of judging, and consists of several elements. First, 
like cases ought to be decided alike. The argument for this is not just reliance, for frequently 
there is no real argument from reliance. The real rationale is that judicial commitment to the 
consistent application of rules and principles should be recognized as an end in itself. Second, 
judges should be loyal to the legal system as a semi-autonomous aspect of state power in a 
way that maximizes systemic harmony. Thus, judges should not just look in the immediate 
zone of a particular rule, statute, or prior decision, but across the entire legal system to resolve 
ambiguities and answer hard questions.  
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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these two closely related doctrines into one cohesive whole. Is there really 
a material difference between them? This Note suggests that there is not. 
They are effectively coterminous, with the exception of the insider 
question. Therefore, I argue for a unified doctrine that subsumes the 
private inurement doctrine within the private benefit doctrine with the 
caveat that insiders—which could be explicitly defined by Treasury 
Regulations—will be held to a higher standard than non-insider persons.  
Mark C. Westenberger
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